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a bstr act  Reflections on the relationship of aesthetics to politics tend to 
circle, almost compulsively, around a relatively stable set of conceptual op-
positions, inherited from German philosophies of the late 18th century. This 
essay proposes an expansion of the theoretical terms of the debate by ex-
tending the field of transcendental aesthetics into the domain of historical 
temporalization. Fundamental art-historical categories may thereby be incor-
porated, philosophically transformed, into ‘aesthetics’ as forms of historical 
temporalization: avant-garde, modern, contemporary. The essay expounds 
two theses, in particular: 1. The historical subsumption of the temporality of 
the avant-garde by the temporality of the modern: the modern stands to the 
avant-garde as the negation of its politics by the repetition of the new –‘the 
new as the ever–same’; 2. the historical subsumption of the temporality of the 
modern by ‘the contemporary’: the contemporary stands to the modern as the 
negation of the dialectical logic – and hence specifically developmentalist 
futurity – of the new by a spatially determined, but imaginary co-presencing. 
One effect of this latter subsumption, it is argued, is a particular, regressive 
‘repetition of the national’, at the level of cultural representation, on the ter-
rain of the global.
k ey wor ds  Avant-Garde, contemporary, modern, repetition, subsumption, 
temporalization, transcendental aesthetics
‘Aesthetics and politics’ has been a set – too often, a settled – topic for 
international conferences and symposia for over thirty years now, since 
the rubric was popularized as the framework for a set of debates with 
their origins in Germany in the 1930s.1 It returns each year, like a kind 
of intellectual second nature, refreshed by the failure of the world to 
move beyond the oppositions it is dedicated to theorizing: expression 
and knowledge, form and commitment, art and non-art, art and life. 
These debates are at once invigorating and blocked. Keeping the inde-
pendent discourses of aesthetics and politics alive, at their limits, by the 
contradictions of their conjunction, the seemingly endless reproduction 
of these oppositions figures something of the restless stasis at the heart 
of the social relations of capitalist societies themselves: the temporality 
of ‘expanded reproduction’.2 At once a reflection of and a reaction to these 
conditions, the opposition between aesthetics and politics functions in 
a quasi-transcendental manner, as a historical a priori, producing some-
thing akin to an aesthetico-political condition in its own right – a kind of 
intellectual scratching of the itch of commodity culture.
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How are we to make of it something more than a symptom of divisions 
that are all-too-readily at once bemoaned and prospectively (but always 
only prospectively) surpassed and thereby, on occasion, wished away: 
divisions between models of un-alienated activity, given the lie by being 
alienated from each other?3
The problem, I think, lies more deeply within the concept and condi-
tion of politics than it does within our understandings of either aesthetic 
or art (which are themselves to be strictly distinguished); although the 
internality of aesthetic to politics – what we might call, the aesthetic di-
mension of political subjectivation – is an essential aspect of politics, in its 
classical sense as a collective practice of the reproduction or transforma-
tion of social relations as a whole.4 Art contributes to the aesthetic dimen-
sion of political subjectivation by reflecting upon it and re-presenting it 
for further reflection, although art itself is rarely of direct political sig-
nificance, of course. (One should not inflate the political significance of 
art – as a widespread tendency to conflate art and aesthetic inclines some 
to do.) One way in which art does this is through the forms of historical 
temporalization (the temporalizations of history) that it enacts, which are 
conditions of its intelligibility: pre-eminently, over the last two centuries, 
the temporalities of avant-garde, modern and contemporary. 
‘Temporalization’ functions here as a metacritical term of transcen-
dental aesthetics, applicable to ‘politics’ and ‘art’ alike, as to other forms 
of social practice and experience. Following Heidegger, I think of tem-
poralization as the process of production of the structure of temporal 
differences, in their dynamically differentiated unity.5 Departing from 
Heidegger, I think of it not as an individually existentially generated 
process (based in a primordial ‘mineness’ of death), but as the temporal 
aspect of practices that are constitutively relational and which produce 
(and reproduce) subjects, in social processes of subjectivation. Such pro-
cesses constitute ‘subjects’ not merely as the epistemological correlate, 
or point of consciousness, of ‘objects’ (the epistemological problematic 
with which both Marx and Heidegger definitively broke), but as the ret-
rospectively projected occupants of the ‘empty place’ of the actions of 
structures.6 ‘Subject’, in its modern (post-Kantian) philosophical sense, 
is primarily, that which acts; but it is also, still, socially, that which is 
‘subjected’ (in the sense of being placed in a subordinate position) to the 
power and authority of others.7 
From the standpoint of the aesthetic dimension of processes of subjec-
tivation, we may say that temporalization is a practice of transcendental 
aesthetics, both in Kant’s basic sense, in which transcendental aesthetic 
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concerns the spatial-temporal conditions of experience, conceived as el-
ements of the subject (the first Critique), and in the second, extended 
Kantian sense of referring to a specific domain of feeling and judgment 
arising from the internal relationship between the faculties, and hence 
concerning the subject’s felt relationship to its (to ‘our’) unity and dis-
unities (the third Critique). As a practice of transcendental aesthetics, 
temporalization is a process at the heart of subjectivation: the process of 
production of subjects. Different processes and practices of temporaliza-
tion inscribe subjects within different forms of historical time. As such, 
they determine the forms of possibility of actions of different kinds. The 
extension of the scope of transcendental aesthetics to historical time in-
corporates both a certain critical art history and certain political tempo-
ralities, within the discourse of ’aesthetics’, thereby providing a basis for 
rethinking the ‘aesthetics and politics’ relation.8
To echo Baudelaire, one may say that art functions here as a kind of 
cultural ‘distillation’ or ‘purification’ of historical-temporal forms. These 
forms of temporality function as models for the historical dimension 
of politics. Indeed, these forms of temporality are themselves political 
forms, of a sort, insofar as politics continues to be thought within an 
imaginative space delineated by the terms of the Enlightenment philos-
ophy of history, however aporetic such a historical conception of politics 
may ultimately be.9
That politics should continue to be thought within an imaginative 
space mapped out by the terms of a philosophical concept of history 
is currently fiercely contested. Indeed, the whole post-Althusserian and 
post-Foucauldian revival of a philosophical thinking of emancipatory 
politics (in the writings of Alain Badiou and Jacques Rancière, in particu-
lar – but also in Gilles Deleuze) is premised, precisely, on the rejection of 
any such notion of history – as, indeed, is the self-consciousness of most 
contemporary art. (There is, in certain respects, a surprising affinity be-
tween the two fields here.) Nonetheless, within art as in politics, as I have 
argued elsewhere, the problem of historical temporalization continues to 
be posed, if only implicitly, as a condition of the intelligibility of social 
experience. In this respect, history is a problem in the Kantian sense: the 
sense in which ‘ideas’ (regulatively necessary concepts of objects beyond 
possible experience) are inherently ‘problematic’. It cannot be escaped.10 
In the case of art today, the problem imposes itself, first and foremost, 
in the question of the critical meaning of the temporality carried by the 
term ‘contemporary’ in the phrase ‘contemporary art’. 
In the wake of the swift disposal – one might almost speak of a 
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blessed obliteration – of the belatedly discredited concept of the post-
modern, and the revival of an interest in avant-gardes (and thereby in 
the critical legacy of Peter Bürger’s 1974 Theory of the Avant-Garde), 
art-critical discourse has begun to have recourse to a three-fold histori-
cal schema to encompass the art of the last two hundred years: avant-
garde, modern and contemporary. One interesting thing about this 
schema is that, while it is in certain respects periodizing, nonetheless, 
at base, in their fundamental conceptual meaning, its categories denote 
not forms, movements or styles, but the prevalence of particular forms 
of historical temporality, each of which has implications for our under-
standing of periodization itself. However, when these temporalities are 
narrated as occurring successively, in a straightforwardly periodizing 
manner (as successive ‘regimes of historicity’, for example, in François 
Hartog’s Foucauldian terminology)11 such a narrative tends itself to 
take place within a homogenous meta-temporality, or historicist ‘empty 
time’, which suspends – as historicism always suspends – the critical 
question of the temporality of the present of the analysis itself, and its 
constitutive relations to the (always effectively genealogical) temporal-
ity of periodization.12
In what follows, I offer some brief reflections upon these three his-
torico-temporal forms – avant-garde, modern and contemporary – the 
relations between them and, in particular, their conflictual co-existence, 
as transcendental-aesthetic aspects of processes and practices of subject 
constitution. My narrative is not that of a simple epochal replacement of 
one form of historicity by another, but rather of an overlaying of one by 
another, in a deepening contradictory complication of temporal forms. 
I do not believe, as John Rajchman has recently asserted, that ‘“avant-
garde” is itself history’,13 in the pejorative sense intended there, whereby 
‘history’ is used to refer to that which is definitively of the past, in the 
sense of no longer being present. Rather, I propose that ‘“avant-garde” is 
itself history’ in the fullest philosophical sense of the term ‘history’, in 
which history is not just also about the present and the future (as well as 
the past), but is primarily so. If, in Heidegger’s phrase, ‘temporality has 
the unity of a future that makes present in the process of having been’, 
the articulation of the relations between the three temporal ecstases, at 
the level of history, is nonetheless considerably more complicated and 
varied than the structure of repetition through which Heidegger himself 
theorized it.14
In particular, I propose two theses, each of which poses problems for 
the aesthetic dimension of political subjectivation, both at the level of 
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social relations, and more particularly, for art as a critically reflective 
social practice.
Thesis 1. The modern stands to the avant-garde as the negation of its 
politics by the repetition of the new (the infamous experience of 
the new as the ever-same).
Thesis 2. The contemporary stands to the modern as the negation of the 
dialectical logic (and hence specifically developmentalist futurity) 
of the new by a spatially determined, imaginary co-presencing. 
This latter thesis is not that of the negation of time by space, as some ad-
vocates of the ‘spatial turn’ have imagined (this is an incoherent notion: 
there is only space-time), but the negation of a specific temporality – a 
specific futurity – by a specific spatiality. The question it raises (too large 
to address here, although I have begun to address it elsewhere)15 is: what 
is the form of futurity of the contemporary? Here, I shall restrict my 
focus to some particular aspects of the two theses themselves. However, 
one should bear in mind that the relationship between the temporalities 
of avant-garde and modern is itself now complicated by their mutual re-
lations to the emergent temporality of a global contemporaneity, within 
which the temporalities of ‘avant-garde’ and ‘modern’ are increasingly 
mediated by the spatial relations between national and transnational 
forms.
Avant-Garde and Modern: Formal Subsumption
‘The trick by which this world of things is mastered’, Walter Benjamin 
famously wrote in his 1929 essay on Surrealism, ‘consists in the substitu-
tion of a political for a historical view of the past.’16 Contained within this 
sentence, when taken together with the materials in Convolute N of the 
Arcades Project, is the seeds of an account of avant-garde as a philosophi-
cal concept: specifically, a certain political temporalization of history.17 
(The opposition of ‘political’ to ‘historical’ here is actually the counter-
position of a non-historicist, interruptive conception of history to the 
chronologically based continuity of historicism that forms the temporal 
ground of historiography.) The distinctiveness of this political temporal-
ization, which requires the explicit affirmation of a particular historical 
future (be it ‘left’ or ‘right’ – there are fascist avant-gardes, of course), can 
be seen in its difference from the modernism to which it was ‘reduced’ 
by Greenberg and others – indeed, by the institutional culture of the art-
world as a whole – after 1939. This is the difference between destruction 
or negation as (1) the condition of specific, politically defined construc-
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tions (‘Construction presupposes destruction’ was Benjamin’s formula-
tion),18 the positivities of which derive from the free appropriation of the 
givenness of certain social and technological conditions; and negation as 
(2) a logical moment in the abstract temporal formalism of the new qua 
new: the fate of the modern under the conditions of the commodification 
of culture, or the new as ‘the aesthetic seal of expanded reproduction’, as 
Adorno put it, ‘with its promise of undiminished plenitude’.19 
The social instantiation of this latter abstract temporal formalism in 
fashion – which Benjamin associated with the dialectic of the new and 
the ever-selfsame (‘the new in the ever-selfsame, and the ever-selfsame 
in the new’), and about which Adorno wrote that ‘the longing for the new 
represses duration’20 – makes it as actual (despite its abstraction) as the 
development of the value form from which it ultimately derives: the ex-
pansion of consumption as a condition of the expanded reproduction of 
capital and the consequent commodification of novelty as the means for 
the capitalistic appropriation of desire. The political problem here con-
cerns the character of the ‘subjects’ produced by such abstract temporal 
processes of subjectivation. These are neither ‘citizen subjects’ (Étienne 
Balibar’s political model for the modern subject)21 nor, primarily, labour-
ing subjects (contradictory amalgams of the individual, collective and 
formal, objectified subject-structures of human labour and capital), but 
consumer subjects and subjects of debt – in both the active and the pas-
sive senses of ‘subject’; that is, as both imaginary sources of free action 
and beings ‘subjected’ to the processes and conditions of the accumula-
tion of capital. As individuals, we are the felt sites of these contradictory 
processes of subjectivation (and many other ones too) – this is our prima-
ry ‘aesthetic dimension’. Such at least is the outcome of the structuralist 
recasting of the existential analytic of Dasein, through which the concept 
of subjectivation achieves its most consistent development. 
Outside of politically defined and sustained cultures of production 
and consumption (for which the historical model remains the brief early 
years of the Soviet Union), the two temporalities of avant-garde and mod-
ern co-exist; or rather, the latter (the modern as the abstractly new) be-
comes the social form through which the former (the avant-garde as the 
politically produced qualitatively historically new) achieves a generalized 
social appearance, in the wake of its failure to be actualized politically. 
We could think of this co-existence as a temporal-cultural version of 
what Marx called formal subsumption: the subsumption of an existing 
labour process to the social relations of the production of value.22 Here, 
the concrete historical novelty of the avant-garde is subsumed to the 
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abstract and formal temporality of the new characteristic of ‘the mod-
ern’ as a temporal schema. There is a contradiction within avant-garde 
practices that are culturally ‘formally subsumed’ to the temporality of 
the modern between the temporal logic of their production process (that 
is, construction as a politicized historical temporalization, a making of 
the future) and the temporal forms under which they are consumed (the 
temporal determinations of the commodity form: the new as the ever-
same). Furthermore, the effect of the sustained repetition of the abstract 
temporal formalism of the new (the primary temporal determination of 
the distribution of the art commodity) has been to reduce further what-
ever qualitative historical novelty it retains, in any particular instance, to 
its relations of difference to other works with which its shares the com-
mon time of its space of exhibition. This represents a further reduction: 
an over-coding of the logic of the modern by that of the contemporary – a 
togetherness in time produced by the appearance of works with differ-
ent temporalities with the same, de-temporalized, abstract art-space (the 
famous ‘white cube’).23 
There has thus been a dual retreat within the temporalizing function 
of the artwork from a historical conception of the future: first, a sub-
sumption of the temporality of the avant-garde to the temporality of the 
modern as the abstractly new (Benjamin’s later thought is located at the 
crisis-point of that transition); second, and subsequently, the attempt to 
save the qualitative aspect of the temporality of the modern from its im-
manent degeneration through repetition, via the more punctual concept 
of the contemporary. However, this spatializes novelty by making co-
presence the condition of the conjunction of the different times it holds 
together. Furthermore, under the conditions of global capital (in which 
‘globalization’ is shorthand for ‘global capitalization’), this is a primarily 
imaginary, speculative or fictional co-presence.24
Just as political debates about social emancipation and the resistance 
to capital have tended to focus on what is beyond the scope of subsump-
tion to the value form – either in historically received non-capitalist so-
cial forms or inherently (for some, ‘ontologically’) non-capitalistic forms 
– so, debates about artistic avant-gardes have shifted from a constitutive 
identification with a post-capitalist future immanent in the potentiality 
of the productive forces developed by capitalism, to the potentiality of 
practices developed outside, or on the regional margins of, the now glob-
ally transnational art market. However, rather than being prospectively 
projected as actualised in a historical future, the anticipation of which 
will historically transform the present, such regional avant-gardes are in-
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stead projected as realising their artistic value within the chronological 
near-future of the international artworld itself. That is to say, they func-
tion as a kind of pre- and non-capitalist anthropological reserve, which 
achieves its avant-garde status not via its anticipation of a prospective 
post-capitalist future, but rather from its prospective subsumption to the 
art institution itself (ultimately, the art market). Indeed, it is precisely 
formal subsumption that preserves the possibility of the constitutively 
contradictory structure of the artwork as at once ‘autonomous’ and ‘so-
cial fact’, from which its critical status derives.25 
The formal subsumption of the temporality of the avant-garde to that 
of the modern performed by art institutions in capitalist societies was 
accompanied, from the outset, by an insistent spatial coding in terms of 
metropolitan, national or regionally delimited territorial forms.26 This 
is a different kind of repetition: not the economically driven, abstract 
repetition of the new (the new as ‘the aesthetic seal of expanded repro-
duction’), but the cultural-political repetition of the national and (at a 
greater distance) the regional, which increasingly functions as the com-
pensatory correlate of its destruction as an economic form, under the 
conditions of a tendentially global transnational capital – ‘after 1989’, and 
after the opening up of capitalist manufacturing in China subsequent to 
its joining the World Trade Organization in 2001, in particular. In the 
context of the history of avant-gardes (and the history of the theory of the 
avant-garde, especially), one exemplary form of this repetition has been 
the recent repetition of the Russian.
Avant-Garde, National, Historical: The Repetition of the Russian
The theoretical understanding of avant-garde art practices in Russia in 
the immediately post-revolutionary period has now turned full, through 
a succession of stages, returning us to its starting point in the idea of a 
Russian avant-garde. Initially conceived as an extension of the pre-rev-
olutionary national-bourgeois artistic avant-garde, with Malevich as the 
central, defining figure of its ‘revolutionary’ artistic continuity, by the 
early 1920s the explicitly communist, internationalist and anti-‘art’ ideas 
of its Constructivist-Productivist trajectory had redefined the logic of 
future-orientated artistic production according to the dual – formal and 
functional – parameters of the concept of construction. Subsequently, 
however, in the 1940s and 1950s, in the West, with reference to its main 
emigré figures (such as Gabo), this heritage was stripped of its function-
alism to produce a politically dissident formalist Constructivism, rein-
tegrated into a history of specifically artistic avant-gardes, as part of a 
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broader modernism27 – the ideological content of Soviet Constructivism 
having been conflated with the Stalinist cultural policy that usurped it. 
This was followed, in the 1960s and early 1970s, by attempts to recover 
the critical social logic of Soviet Constructivism, culminating in its re-
positioning as part of a broader, anti-art institutional ‘historical’ avant-
garde, in Peter Bürger’s 1974 Theory of the Avant-Garde – a work that 
condensed two decades of renewed reception, from the standpoint not of 
social revolution as such, but its refraction in the ‘anti-art’ of Dada and 
Surrealism.28 Finally, after 1989 and the apparently definitive closure of 
a 70-year episode in Russian and world history, the avant-garde of the 
1920s once again began to appear as distinctively Russian, harking back 
to the terms of the pre-internationalist 19th-century, dissident bourgeois, 
national avant-gardes from which the description originated. (And this 
despite the fact that, from the standpoint of the emerging post-Soviet 
nationalisms, Malevich appears as a Ukrainean – and not a ‘Russian’ – 
artist.)
The sequence of dominant Western understandings of the avant-garde 
in Russia from the beginning to the end of the 20th century thus runs:
 Early 20th century  Russian
 1920s    Communist/Soviet 
 1940s/50s   Dissident formalist
 1960s/70s   ‘Historical’
 1990s–    Russian
If not a spiral of forgetting, this is at least a spiral of recoding: a recoding 
of the communist (via the Soviet) as the Russian. If there is repetition 
here, in this sequence of designations, it is not the repetition of what 
has become known as the ‘repetition paradigm’, from ‘historical’ to ‘neo’ 
avant-gardes and beyond, as set out by Benjamin Buchloh and later Hal 
Foster in the 1980s and 1990s, as the enabling condition of the historical 
legitimation of a retroactively declared institutional critique as the con-
tinuation of the historical avant-garde under the conditions of the ‘neo’.29 
Nor is it the ‘repetition of revolution’ – the repetition of revolution as 
counter-revolution, in Boris Groys’s formulation, whereby political revo-
lution appears as artistic counter-revolution.30 It is the repetition of the 
Russian as a national coding, within a globally expanded art market, 
in which it is the financial strength of Russian buyers, rather than the 
significance of contemporary Russian art, which has imposed a sense of 
‘the Russian’ on the market.
In the development of this series, the concept of the ‘historical’ avant-
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garde performs a complex and subtlely double-coded role. On the one 
hand, it acts as an agent of political neutralization, by consigning the po-
litical conception of avant-garde definitively to the past, via the restricted 
connotation of ‘historical’ meaning ‘of the past’. The historical avant-
garde is ‘historical’ in this sense because it is over; more particularly, it is 
supposedly over because it ‘failed’ (just as conceptual art was later said 
to have failed). And the political avant-garde failed because Soviet Com-
munism failed – quite early on, by the end of the 1920s, let us say (albeit 
not, pace Groys, by 1925). It thus became, retrospectively, ‘utopian’. Its 
utopianism is the effect of its failure. Indeed, it is deemed to have failed 
so fundamentally that on Bürger’s schema the term ‘historical’ displaces 
the term ‘communist’. (This is not, I think, merely an effect of Bürger’s 
guiding reference to Dada and Surrealism, but a fundamental part of the 
book’s political unconscious.) The term ‘historical’ covers over the poli-
tics of the avant-gardes of the 1920s by its very mode of acknowledging 
them, preparing the way for the subsequent preservation of the ‘treasure’ 
of their revolutionary heritage. (This is the paradigm of cultural history 
to which Benjamin, for example, was explicitly opposed.)31
However, the so-called historical avant-garde was also ‘historical’ in 
a second, deeper sense: it was historical by virtue of its investment in 
history, as a whole, in the collective singular – not as ‘the past’ alone, 
but, in order to complete that whole, by representing the future. The ‘his-
torical’ avant-garde was socially and politically (and not merely artisti-
cally) avant-garde; hence, precisely not ‘artistically’ if the sense of this 
latter term is restricted to the predominant modern conception of art as 
autonomous. When The First Working Group of Constructivists (Alek-
sei Gan, Rodchenko, Stepanova) announced ‘IRRECONCILABLE WAR 
AGAINST ART’, in 1922, it was because ‘A CONSTRUCTIVE LIFE IS 
THE ART OF THE FUTURE’ (1921).32 This sense of the ‘historical’ in the 
historical avant-garde kicks against the neutralization of its politics in-
volved in Bürger’s narrower usage, by retaining a sense of its politics as a 
collective construction of life, at the level of history (‘THE COMMUNIST 
EXPESSION OF MATERIAL CONSTRUCTIONS’, as the First Working 
Group put it),33 as a permanent possibility – immanent with the histori-
cal ontology of the social. This is the philosophical core of the Construc-
tivist avant-garde. However, ironically, it is the very permanence of this 
possibility – and thereby the abstraction of its basic terms, ‘construction’ 
and ‘life’ – that allows for its imagistic freezing, not merely as an ‘instan-
taneous picture of a process’ (Lissitzky), but as an eternalized form, wait-
ing, as in a fairytale, to be reawakened. Benjamin’s ‘dialectical fairytale’, 
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the subtitle of his initial version of the Arcades Project, is in this respect 
a better description of the current fate of historical communism than of 
19th century capitalism. Recent ontologizations of communism as ‘idea’ 
attest to this fate.34
In fact, with regard to Bürger’s historical avant-garde, the very expres-
sion ‘art into life’ harbours an aestheticist misrepresentation of the com-
munist avant-garde’s replacement of one art (the art of composition) by 
another (the art of construction = ‘the organization of elements’) that is 
always already engaged with ‘life’; and hence does not need to go ‘into’ 
life. It is already there. This marks the critical primacy of the avant-garde 
of the 1920s over those of 1914–1919. Aestheticism had already projected 
the generalization of the aesthetic aspect of the artwork into the sphere 
of life as a whole. (Think here of Benjamin’s formulation: the avant-garde 
was the ‘cargo’ of ‘art for art’s sake’, ‘a cargo that could not be declared 
because it still lacked a name’.)35 Constructivism is no generalized aes-
theticism. It is the generalization of the principle of construction. This is 
a generalization that is necessarily, in part, mimetic as well as construc-
tive, and hence (as Gan, Rodchenko and Stepanova said) expressive. This 
is a side of constructivism that is rarely discussed: that speculative iden-
tity of construction and expression to which both Adorno and the later 
Deleuze point as the telos of the non-organic work of art or machinic art 
assemblage.36
Peter Bürger’s Theory of the Avant-Garde leads us astray here, in figur-
ing its early 20th-century ‘historical’ avant-garde from the institutional 
standpoint of the neo, as its future negation. This may apply to Dada, 
but Constructivism was effectively (rather than rhetorically) indifferent 
to art-institutional negation, since, in the period immediately after the 
Revolution, there were very few actual institutions left to negate. In fact, 
institutions needed building, alongside the application of the principle of 
construction to the re-organization of everyday life. Hence the prolifer-
ating collective art organizations of the early soviet years, from the Art 
Department of the Moscow Council of Soldiers’ Deputies (of which Ma-
levich was the President as early as September 1917) to the UNOVIS col-
lective (‘Affirmers of the New’) at the art academy in Vitebsk. Construc-
tivism contained Productivism within itself as one of three elements: 
‘laboratory’ formalism, reorganization of everyday life, and organization 
of production. There was no necessary contradiction there. At the level 
of theory, that conflict was a phoney war. The invocation of institutional 
critique as the ‘good’ political repetition of the avant-garde of the inter-
war period, as opposed to the ‘bad’ formalist one of the neo-avant-garde 
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is thus largely spurious; doubly so, in fact, since institutional critique is 
more concerned with art institutionality than the autonomous works of 
laboratory constructivism, the formalism of which was produced in an-
ticipation of life-functional applications, rather than for their own sake; 
unlike the predominantly, albeit negatively, art-functional applications 
of institutional critique. The issue rather concerns construction as the 
expression of a particular historical form of the social; hence, alternative 
constructions as expressions of alternative forms, levels and aspects of 
the social: ‘communist expressions of material constructions’, and capital-
ist expressions of material constructions. In theoretical terms, ‘the Rus-
sian’ is relegated here to no more than a mediating cultural-historical 
form, and a form, moreover, which carries with it the permanent danger 
of the illusion of an autonomous ‘cultural history’.37 Historically, though, 
this illusion has been the mediating condition of the global extension 
of the art market, organizing meaning according to interacting national 
narratives. The temporality of the contemporary finds itself critically 
suspended here between understandings of it as a kind of recently spa-
tially expanded chronological co-presence, making possible exchanges 
between all nations, on the one hand, and a radically disjunctive field 
of relations, on the other, in which a multiplicity of different times are at 
play, which have to be actively conjoined. Only the latter is adequate to 
the concept of temporalization, and thereby to a properly historical form 
of transcendental aesthetics.
Contemporaneity: Co-Presence or Active Conjunction?
Although the word has a long history (derived from the medieval Latin 
contemporarius, and the late Latin contemporalis, the English ‘contempo-
rary’ dates from around the mid 17th century) the philosophical think-
ing of contemporaneity is a distinctively post-Hegelian phenomenon, as-
sociated in the first instance with Kierkegaard’s existential theology. It 
emerges there as a philosophical concept of simultaneity in opposition to 
its everyday historicist meaning of living, existing, or occurring together 
in the same chronological time. As Gadamer puts it, in his ontological 
deployment of the Kierkegaardian notion against the idea of the ‘simul-
taneity of aesthetic consciousness’: ‘Contemporaneity [Gleichzeitigkeit – 
literally, same-time-ness PO] for Kierkegaard, does not mean existing at 
the same time’. It is ‘not a mode of giveness in consciousness, but a task 
for consciousness and an achievement that is required of it’. More specifi-
cally, for Kierkegaard, contemporaneity is ‘a formulation of the believer’s 
task of so totally combining one’s own presence and the redeeming act of 
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Christ, that the latter is experienced as something present (not as some-
thing in the past)’. It thus consists in ‘holding on to the object in such a 
way that … all mediation is dissolved in total presentness’. This appears, 
superficially, to be similar to the simultaneity of aesthetic consciousness. 
Gadamer argues, ‘aesthetic consciousness depends on the concealment of 
the task that contemporaneity sets’, while Kierkegaardian contempora-
neity, despite its dissolution of mediation, nonetheless understands this 
immediacy, paradoxically, as an achievement, and not as a given.38
This philosophical notion as the contemporary as a task and achieve-
ment of temporal combination (of past and present within the present) 
remained confined to religious existentialism until, in the immediate af-
termath of the Second World War, it began to acquire a historical mean-
ing, through the use of the term to denote a new epochal periodization 
in contrast to ‘the modern’.39 The immediate postwar years saw new uses 
of ‘contemporary’ in English to denote both an emergent style of design 
(‘contemporary design’) and the artistic present more generally (‘contem-
porary arts’), in their differences from the preceding period. This is the 
source of that sense of up-to-dateness with which the term remains pre-
dominantly identified in popular usage.
When the Institute of Contemporary Arts (ICA) was founded in Lon-
don in 1946, for example, it was very up-to-date indeed. Doubly and para-
doxically so, in fact, in so far as it both fed off the residual energies of 
the pre-war avant-garde, acting out a weakened version of its temporal 
logic of futurity, and took a step back from that avant-garde’s ruptural 
historical futurity into the more expansive present of a new beginning. 
In the years immediately following the Second World War, the future 
was imaged as much by the desire to throw off the restrictions of war-
time life and achieve some kind of ‘normality’ as by the fundamental 
social changes that the end of the war was to bring about.40 In the UK, 
unlike France and Italy, no break with capitalism was envisaged, but 
rather a different capitalism, of peace and social democratic reconstruc-
tion (although ‘Cold War’ would soon become the new name for peace 
in Europe). The transformation of ‘advanced’ art’s identification with a 
radically different future – associated in Britain largely with surrealism – 
into an identification with a more extended present exchanged the antici-
pation of an ‘end of art’ (the avant-garde dissolution of art into life) for a 
focus on interactions between the arts, and popular and technologically 
advanced arts, like cinema, architecture and advertising in particular. 
This was characteristic of the work of The Independent Group at the ICA 
(1952–55), for example, culminating in the This is Tomorrow exhibition at 
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the Whitechapel in 1956. The future, apparently, had already arrived – a 
standpoint later ironized in Victor Burgin’s 1976 photowork, This is the 
Tomorrow You Were Promised Yesterday.
However, the separating out of ‘modern’ and ‘contemporary’ that this 
notion of contemporary arts involves in no way dominated the histori-
cal consciousness of the institutional field of art at that time.41 Rather, 
the contemporary acted there mainly as a qualification of (rather than a 
counter to) ‘the modern’: the contemporary was the most recent modern, 
but a modern with a moderated, less ruptural futurity. ‘Contemporary’ 
was still not enough of a critical concept in its own right by the 1970s to 
be included in Raymond Williams’s influential Keywords: A Vocabulary 
of Culture and Society (1976). And when, a decade later, Matei Calinescu 
updated his book Faces of Modernity (1977) into Five Faces of Moder-
nity (1987) it was ‘postmodernism’ that provided the topic for the new 
chapter – alongside terms already established by the end of the 1930s 
– ‘modernism’, ‘avant-garde’, ‘decadence’ and ‘kitsch’ – despite the fact 
that the chapter on ‘The Idea of Modernity’ (written in the mid 1970s) 
still ended with the emphatic declaration that ‘the Querelle des anciens et 
des modernes has been replaced by a Quarrel between the moderns and 
the contemporaries’.42 By the mid-1980s, postmodernism had become the 
periodizing term of choice to mark the distance from a now-historical 
modernism, a distance that had previously been registered by the pres-
entness of the contemporary. For some historicists, like Fredric Jameson, 
this seemed to imply that the postmodern was ‘post-contemporary’.43 
Fortunately, the term did not stick. In fact, it has been only with the 
decisive discrediting of postmodernism as a coherent critical concept, in 
the last ten years, that ‘contemporary’ has begun to emerge into the criti-
cal daylight from beneath its commonplace function as a label denoting 
what is current or up-to-date. Hence the recent rush of writing trying to 
make some minimal theoretical sense of the concept.44 
This writing reflects the fact that having emerged as a self-designating 
periodizing term after 1945, of a quasi-epochal kind (much like ‘renais-
sance’ self-designated its present as a new beginning), thereby gradually 
condemning the established referents of ‘modern’ to the past, the struc-
ture of contemporaneity is itself changing. Indeed, the very idea of con-
temporaraneity as a condition is new. At the same time, the widespread 
diffusion of the term has placed it in danger of being emptied out of 
its increasingly complex temporal-existential, social and political mean-
ings, by being treated as a simple label or periodizing category. This is of 
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the changing temporal quality of the historical present over the last few 
decades is best expressed through the distinctive conceptual grammar 
of con-temporaneity, a coming together not simply ‘in’ time, but of times: 
we do not just live or exist together ‘in time’ with our contemporaries – as 
if time itself is indifferent to this existing together – but rather the pres-
ent is increasingly characterized by a coming together of different, but 
equally ‘present’ temporalities or ‘times’, a temporal unity in disjunction, 
or a disjunctive unity of present times.45 
This is not the simple combination of a particular existential present 
with a particular (religious) past, of Kierkegaard’s founding philosophi-
cal concept of contemporaneity as a task and an achievement; rather it is 
a geo-politically disfuse multiplicity of social times, combined within the 
present of a constitutively problematic, speculative or fictional ‘subject’ 
of historical experience. This problematically disjunctive conjunction is 
covered over by the straightforward, historicist use of ‘contemporary’ as 
a periodizing term, in the manner in which it is encountered in main-
stream art history, for example, in its stabilization of the distinction be-
tween modern and contemporary art. Although, within this discourse, 
as a register of the continual historical movement of the present, we 
nonetheless find several competing periodizations of contemporary art, 
overlapping genealogies or historical strata, differently extended senses 
of the present, within the wider time-span of a Western modern art of 
which is constructed from the standpoint of the rupture of a particular 
historical event and privileges a particular geo-political terrain.46 The 
competition between these conceptions registers their epistemologically 
constructive and politically overdetermined characters. Each is itself cut 
across by complex imbrications within the present of the abiding, inter-
laced temporal forms of the avant-garde and the modern outlined above. 
The extension of transcendental aesthetics into the field of historical 
temporalization thereby transforms the question of the relationship of 
aesthetics to politics in a theoretically fundamental manner. It is not 
longer a question of actualizing positions within a field defined by a 
relatively stable set of conceptual oppositions and relations, inherited 
from philosophies of the late 18th century. It has become the conjointly 
philosophical, empirical and political task of grasping and constructing 
the possible political meanings of new and internally complex sets of 
temporal relations, in uneven and rapidly changing spatial distributions. 
For now, ‘art’ remains an emblematically privileged site of such relations; 
for how much longer, it is unclear. 
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